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ABSTRACT 
 
Ama Ata Aidoo’s Changes documents the changing situations of contemporary women in Accra, 
Ghana. The novel deals with an idea of the Western-styled universalist language of women’s rights, 
a concept that constructs certain understandings of women’s rights as applicable to all women. The 
protagonist Esi’s preference for polygamy as a potentially liberating system for a professional 
woman appears to challenge a universal thought of what women rights should be, especially with 
the understanding that polygamy is patriarchal. However, Esi’s preference brings up the notion of 
cultural relativism and challenges the universal claims of human rights. Cultural realities – 
developed over ages in different societies – complicate any universal vision of human rights. 
Considering the conflicts between universalism and cultural relativism, this paper investigates how 
Aidoo uses Esi (after her choice of polygamy over monogamy) to confirm the fact that cultural 
realities relative to a Ghanaian society complicate any universalist approach to the rights of a 
woman. Hence, the novel can be interpreted as an effort to question the totalizing claims of 
women’s rights that are based on Western notions of what women’s and human rights should be. 
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Ama Ata Aidoo’s Changes depicts the character of 
Esi as a divided personality. At the start of the 
novel, she is a strong character defying the 
traditional expectations of her society. She is 
educated, drives her own car, has a government 
job, and is against giving birth to more than one 
child. Her actions challenge the patriarchal 
expectations of her society. Due to her views on 
how a professional woman should live and her 
husband Oko’s inability to cope with those views 
as he looks for traditional custom of obedience 
from Esi, their marriage collapses. But her later 
choice of polygamy complicates her ability to 
realize her desire to be free. Until her second 
marriage, her freedom as a modern African woman 
is remarkable although with fair amount of 
struggles. Although Esi “knows that living in a 
polygamous marriage will bring a series of 
complications” (Curry 188), she desires to be the 
second wife of Ali thinking polygamy as a 
compromise solution. In so doing, she accepts a 
patent traditional act although she blatantly 
opposes traditional customs. Nada Elia’s remark in 
this regard is indicative of the complications of 
polygamy: “[Esi’s decisions to enter] into a 
polygamous relationship…comes as a disturbing 
surprise to her friends and family, as well as the 
reader” (143). Considering the dichotomies 
between universalism and cultural relativism, this 
essay examines the complications that arise from 
Esi’s choice of polygamy over monogamy in her 
struggle to be free, an act that Simpson argues as 
“an unconventional one” (163) that complicates the 
voice of a woman from a human rights point of 
view. 
 
The relation between culture and human rights is 
meaningful. According to Osaka, “culture is one 
significant factor that shapes human thinking and 
behavior to a great extent. Thus its influence on 
human beings affects their basic attribute: human 
rights” (2). But the human rights concept is widely 
contested due to the different perceptions of human 
rights between Western and non-Western societies, 
and within them as well. As a result, the 
universality of human rights is argued as well 
(Osaka 1). People have different views of “whether 
rights claims are based on status as an individual 
human being or status as a member of some 
community or group of persons” and of “the extent 
to which rights are viewed as absolute or relative” 
(emphases as found in Osaka 2). 
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Universalism and cultural relativism are two 
different understandings of human rights as 
Elisabeth Reichert suggests: “two of the most 
important concepts in terms of understanding the 
application of human rights to policies and 
practices will be universalism and cultural 
relativism” (23). And the conflict between these 
two ideologies is one of the most striking problems 
that characterize women’s rights discourse. 
Bhabhani Shankar Nayak maintains that “The 
challenge for women’s rights as human rights is the 
question of ‘how can human rights be authorized in 
radically different societies without succumbing 
either to homogenizing universalism or the 
paralysis of cultural relativism?’” (83) 
Universalism argues that cultures will ultimately 
change to accept the same system of law and rights 
as Western cultures have because “all human 
beings share the same inalienable rights” (Mayer, 
qtd. in Nayak 84). But cultural relativism rejects 
this view and debates that “values and norms are 
specific to cultures, thus, there cannot be one set of 
universal values and norms on which human rights 
are based” (Nayak 84). 
 
While universalism considers an individual as the 
principal social constituent, who enjoys absolute 
rights in the pursuit of self-interest, cultural 
relativism accepts community as the core social 
module. Concepts of individualism, freedom of 
choice, and equality are secondary to cultural 
relativists as community is their first priority. 
Following cultural relativism many states look at 
universalism as impositions of western rights and 
values and as a form of cultural imperialism. 
Mayer argues that “human rights reflect Western 
values and norms, not those subscribed to by non-
Western cultures” (qtd. in Nayak 84). However, 
cultural relativism is an inconsistent idea in itself. 
It is very often that one group denies rights of 
another group within a culture because of the clash 
of personal or group interests. Human rights, 
therefore, cannot be genuinely universal unless 
they are bound to cultural decisions that are often 
made in a culture. Jack Donnelly remarks: “A 
cultural relativist account of human rights…seems 
to be guilty of logical contradiction. If human 
rights are based in human nature…and if human 
nature is universal, then how can human rights be 
relative in any fundamental way?” (403). This 
questions the cultural relativists’ claim of human 
rights and their relativity to a culture. Thus both 
universalism and cultural relativism are 
complicated issues in regard to their connections to 
human rights. 
 
There are critics who ask for alternative 
frameworks beyond universalism and cultural 
relativism. Rao, for example argues: “One possible 
reconciliation between these tensions may be the 
acknowledgement that the dichotomy between 
universalism and relativism is an artificial 
construct” (qtd. in Nayak 87). Elshtain proposes 
another solution to the issue “by stating that a 
global feminist consciousness can create feminisms 
which are unique to regions and develop from 
within women’s existing culture, thus making 
feminism appropriate to the particular needs of 
women in various regions and cultures” (qtd. in 
Nayak 87). Peach, a feminist theorist, generates a 
“feminist pragmatic theory” to mitigate the 
conflicts between universalism and cultural 
relativism, where she argues that “theory and 
practice are inseparable in the endeavor towards 
increasing and implementing women’s rights. The 
primary consideration…is which strategies of 
asserting women’s rights are most effective in a 
particular context” (qtd. in Nayak 87). Here, Peach 
may be looking for an equilibrium between 
universalism and cultural relativism. Echoing this 
strategy, Donnelly claims that “it may be necessary 
to allow limited cultural variations in the form and 
interpretation of particular human rights, but we 
must insist on their fundamental moral 
universality” (qtd. in Nayak 87). Donnelly further 
remarks that “radical or unrestricted relativism is as 
inappropriate as unrestricted universalism; some 
sort of intermediate position is required” (406).This 
alternative framework might be considered in 
reading Aidoo’s Changes as well, as Simpson 
argues that in Changes Aidoo “explore[s] the ever-
contentious topic of polygamy, a traditional 
institution she neither defends nor rejects, but uses 
as a means to negotiate a new identity for her 
protagonist” (156). Susan Arndt resonates this 
alternative framework thus: “The African discourse 
on feminism is manifested in part in the 
theorisation of alternative concepts of feminism” 
(32). Arndt also states that “African-feminist 
literatures have proved flexible enough to take into 
account and provide a forum for differing 
perceptions and visions of a (new) coexistence of 
men and women…[which is an] African alternative 
to western concepts…[of] the monopoly of White 
feminisms” (43). 
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Esi Sekyi, the protagonist of Aidoo’s Changes, is a 
modern woman with a master’s in statistics and a 
well-paid government job in Accra. She looks to 
bridge her career with her duties as a wife and 
mother. However, she feels imprisoned by Oko’s 
expectations of subordination and obedience to 
traditional customs. As a result, in her quest for 
independence she leaves Oko and moves into a 
polygamous marriage with Ali Kondey. It is ironic 
that although Ali is attracted to her because of her 
air of independence, Esi is not the one who is in 
control of this relationship. And ultimately, she is 
again a subordinate to a man, and in her search for 
independence, she ends the romantic relationship 
with Ali as well. This is a totally unpredictable 
situation as Simpson argues, “In Changes, Aidoo 
explores the challenge of ‘having the best the 
environment has to offer’ through characters like 
Esi, a woman who appears to have both a well-
paying career and a family, but who is not sure 
what she expects of a life lived in a modern world 
grounded in a traditional society” (156). In this 
connection, Solomon Omatsola Azumurana says:  
 
As an African woman, the cultural prescription 
and expectation is that she should be ready at 
all times and in whatever circumstances fulfill 
her husband’s sexual pleasures and desires. 
But as a Western educated woman, Esi thinks 
otherwise. She believes, in opposition to her 
culture and in tandem with her Western 
education, that a woman also reserves the right 
to exercise a measure of authority over her 
body and decide when and how she can and 
should make love with her husband (7). 
 
So, the contradiction or the gap between the 
modern (liberal) and the traditional (conservative) 
complicates the lives of the people in a society. 
And in case of Esi, the gap between the African 
cultural expectations and her thoughts of 
independence complicates her desire of becoming a 
free woman. She looks forward to solving the 
complication through a polygamous marriage— a 
compromise— between Ali and her. 
 
Oko, Esi’s husband, often fights with her on the 
issues of her work and her role as a wife and 
mother. Although he loves her very much, he 
cannot tolerate her air of independence in relation 
to him. He wants her to spend more time with him 
in the role of a wife that the traditional society 
expects from her. However, Esi dismisses Oko and 
“admits that her monogamous marriage to Oko is 
stifling” (Curry 185). Empowered with financial 
independence, Esi may be trying to claim power 
over her own self that traditionally belongs to Oko, 
the male. And in the pursuit of authority, self-
respect, and pride as a man Oko rapes her. In an 
African community like Accra, Esi’s consideration 
of Oko’s sexual violence as “marital rape” (11) 
instead of a husband’s traditional right indicates 
disobedience although Accra as a big city is ahead 
of the country as a whole and that is why Esi 
behaves more as an Accran than as a Ghanaian in 
making her demands. In the post-rape scenario the 
narrative reveals: “What really finished her was her 
eyes catching sight of the cloth trailing behind Oko 
who looked like some arrogant king” (10). This 
“scene evokes antithetical images of subject and 
object, exaltation and humility, power and 
powerlessness, and Esi knows on which side of the 
gender divide she falls. But she also knows that the 
divide is a social construction designed to limit, 
even deny, her humanity” (Allan 180). 
 
Esi’s decision to be a second wife to Ali, who “has 
had a traditional upbringing [and who] seems to 
exemplify the figure of a modern, Western-
educated African…a complex, hybrid character” 
(Simpson 164), and to live a life as assumed by her 
is never going to be easy because Ali is also a 
traditional African man with all his education and 
profession. As a modern woman, Esi is having 
difficulty seeing herself as an “occupied territory” 
(91) of Ali. But Ali counters thus: “What 
difference should that make? And what is this 
about ‘only a second wife’? Isn’t a wife a wife?” 
(89). In fact, Esi is in a world of duality with 
opposing pulls of tradition and modernity as 
Simpson claims:  
 
Aidoo circumvents generic constraints in her 
depiction of the search for what constitutes a 
modern African female identity. The 
difficulties attendant on this search are 
dramatised in Aidoo’s portrayal of the 
character of Esi, a woman who seems to have 
the opportunity to live her life as she wishes 
but who must do so within a society still 
subject to a stereotypical conception of 
African women and their designated place in 
the world, a place most often associated with 
the roles of wife, mother and helping hand or, 
in more modern terms, the realms of power, 
financial or academic success. (162) 
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Ali supports polygamy as a cultural identity while 
answering Esi’s query about polygamy and its 
meaning in the modern African context. He is not 
at all content with Esi’s equation of bigamy with 
polygamy and contends thus:  
 
When put like that, yes, we are committing a 
crime. Polygamy, bigamy. To the people who 
created the concepts, these are all crimes. Like 
homicide, rape and arson. Why have we got so 
used to describing our cultural dynamics with 
the condemnatory tone of our masters’ voices? 
We have got marriage in Africa, Esi. In 
Muslim Africa. In non-Muslim Africa. And in 
our marriages a man has a choice – to have 
one or more wives. (90) 
 
Here, Ali is explaining his marriage to Esi from an 
African cultural point of view. Esi is frustrated 
finding Ali’s thought grounded on a strong African 
social perspective as he forces her to wear the ring. 
Just after that moment, Esi starts falling short of 
her expression with gaps in her speech: 
“Oh…Ali…Oh…Ali…Ali. Esi tries several times 
to explain what she found so highly amusing. She 
failed each time” (91). These “blank spaces appear 
in place of her ‘voice’…indicate Esi’s lack of an 
independent identity, [and] her loss of a ‘voice’ as 
well” (Simpson 168). In this connection, Tuzyline 
Jita Allan writes: “As Esi gets entangled in love, 
her sturdy independence begins to turn flabby, 
leaving her enervated almost to the point of a 
nervous breakdown” (183). 
 
In their effort to get married, Esi and Ali “agreed 
that since custom did not permit them to drive 
down in the same vehicle, they would have to 
travel separately” (91) to Esi’s relatives. It’s ironic 
that they are going to be in a non-traditional 
relationship, but cautious of a tradition to 
materialize that. Indeed, Aidoo creates a complex 
web of actions –traditional and non-traditional –
which complicate the question of women’s rights 
in Changes. In this context, Simpson argues that 
“[i]n failing to adhere to the conventions of a 
polygamous marriage, they [Esi and Ali] legalise 
their union and thereby ironically confirm the 
Western perception of polygamy that Ali has just 
dismissed. In this way, the characters must live in a 
modern world that is often complicated by 
traditional views and social structures that they do 
not really understand” (163). Simpson further notes 
that Esi “refuses to consider the implications of 
having entered into a polygamous marriage, a 
traditional structure difficult to maintain in a 
modern world. In her desire to identify herself in 
relation to Ali on her own terms she chooses to 
ignore the key fact that polygamy is a social 
institution and will therefore have far-reaching 
social and personal effects” (164). Esi is not 
conscious that although “in urban Ghana domestic 
changes have…taken place…African women still 
have to cope with deeply ingrained cultural belief. 
These are the reminders that they cannot cut their 
umbilical cord with their traditional communities” 
(Curry 181). Esi does not recognize African 
feminism that underscores polygamy as a feminist 
approach that asks for women’s emancipation as 
Carole Boyce Davies explains: “[African 
feminism] sees utility in the positive aspects of 
extended family and polygamy with respect to 
childcare and the sharing of the household 
responsibilities, traditions which are compatible 
with modern working women’s lives…but which 
were distorted by colonialism and continue to be 
distorted in the urban environment” (9). 
 
Aidoo further complicates the issues of human 
rights by raising questions from African women’s 
perspectives about Esi’s decision to be the second 
wife of Ali. Opokuya questions Esi: “Can you see 
yourself and Ali’s wife getting together?...Being 
friends?” (97). While Esi answers in the negative, 
Opokuya clarifies: “In the village, or rather in a 
traditional situation, it was not possible for a man 
to consider taking a second wife without the first 
wife’s consent” (97). Here, from an African 
perspective, Esi is destroying the terrain of the 
rights of another woman—Fusena. It seems that Esi 
is unaware of the African culture, tradition, and 
ritual of a second marriage as she “conceive[s] of 
[the] marriage in very individualistic” manner 
(Nfah-Abbenyi 295). Opokuya informs Esi of the 
pre-requisites of happiness in a polygamous 
marriage: “In a polygamous situation, or rather in 
the traditional environment in which polygamous 
marriages flourished, happiness, like most of the 
good things of this life, was not a two-person 
enterprise. It was the business of all parties 
concerned” (98). Simpson observes a similar point 
in Changes and affirms that “Aidoo clearly points 
out that marriage can only be successful if it suits 
the individuals concerned, and if it is conducted in 
such a way that social institutions will support it” 
(157). And being unaware of the cultural realities 
Esi is complicating her life and Fusena’s as well. 
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Esi’s marriage is a failure because she romanticizes 
“love” as “life” by ignoring the “cultural reality” of 
love which “is not safe…[and] dangerous” (Curry 
183). Obiechina argues further “that the concept [of 
love] is alien to African traditions and therefore 
creates tensions because of conflicts with 
traditional expectations and customs” (Curry 183), 
which Esi overlooks and ultimately complicates her 
life. Esi does not realize sex from an African 
perspective as Buchi Emecheta remarks, “‘Sex is 
part of [African women’s] life. It is not THE life,’ 
should serve as an eye-opener not only to Western 
feminists but as words of caution to Western-
educated African feminists like Esi” (qtd. in Nfah-
Abbenyi 295). She “needs to ascribe her sexuality 
within the larger context of historical and cultural 
Ghanaian practices that obviously do govern even a 
modern ‘alternative lifestyle.’ She must learn to see 
her body as a contested terrain where sexuality and 
cultural politics converge and find expression in 
dialectical relation” (Nfah-Abbenyi 295). In fact, 
Esi must (un)learn the African social complications 
of human, women rights, of traditions social 
institutions, of (polygamous) marriage, of the 
metaphoric definitions of sex in Africa to sort out 
her complications. She needs to (un)learn that her 
body is a body embodied in Africa and in African 
culture. 
 
The African cultural realities complicate the rights 
of Esi as a wife, and as a woman in her relationship 
with Ali. In the novel, “Esi negotiates the cultural 
constraints imposed by her polygamous second 
marriage to Ali, a wealthy Muslim man, and tries 
to face…[the] new challenge” (Curry 187), the 
challenge to face the terrain of Islam and Islamic 
culture in Africa. As Esi and Ali are from different 
religions, there always remains a gap between 
them, and Ali feels guilty about that: “Hopelessly 
guilty because he knew that there was not the 
slightest possibility of him ever being able to 
establish any rituals in the relationship with Esi” 
(119). And to Esi, as Curry observes, “at the core 
of Esi’s dilemma is that Ali, unlike Oko, is from a 
Muslim culture” (187). However, Esi seems willing 
to try to establish some new rituals but Ali seems 
so defeatist from before that even he starts 
complicating Esi’s situation further. According to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”[a]ll 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights” (Article 1) and “[e]veryone is entitled 
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status” (Article 2, UDHR) which is in 
direct contrast to what is seen in Changes. As 
Curry puts it, “[i]n the novel the Christian and 
Muslim communities are actually presented as 
existing in two separate spatial spheres in the city; 
they do not share the same cultural and ethnic 
standards” (187). Vincent Odamtten argues further 
that “the gap between the two communities is not 
only religious and cultural but also political and 
economic” (qtd. in Curry 188). This point, in fact, 
further complicates the issue of rights and in such a 
case an alternative renegotiation seems necessary 
to mitigate the gap between universalism and 
cultural relativism in finding a suitable position for 
a woman like Esi. 
 
As an independent woman, Esi’s relationship with 
Ali seems critical in respect of her rights as a 
woman. With Oko the relationship is husband and 
wife but with Ali it’s “man and wife” (115) and she 
is now dependent (although emotionally and not 
financially) on Ali, which she is ashamed of –”[I]t 
was a shame for her dependence on a man” (120). 
The relationship is going nowhere because they are 
neither like husband-wife nor like friends. Esi’s 
thoughts for an individual woman, free of social 
barricades, seem far away. The rights she searches 
for with Ali, after failing with Oko, are 
undiscovered. The only thing she develops is 
loneliness: “she soon realizes that she is trapped in 
a relationship that only brings her loneliness and 
disillusion” (Curry 188).  
 
Esi’s situation gets more complicated and tragic 
while she feels “restless and lonely…[and] could 
not plan anything” (141). She is now free without a 
family, or an African traditional home. She still has 
the opportunity to claim her rights as a woman, as a 
human being but it is complicated because there is 
no one with her to whom she can claim her rights. 
She is alienated from others because they will 
never understand why she feels as she does. Her 
anxiety of situation is expressed thus: “[I]n what 
way was her situation different from what it would 
have been if she had simply stayed as Ali’s 
mistress” (149). According to Bryce this 
complicated condition of Esi “is not simply a 
personal dilemma for Esi, but a condition of 
contemporary life in Ghana where traditional rules 
have been superseded, but not replaced” (qtd. in 
Curry 188). Ali tries to keep aside the queries 
regarding his absences by presenting Esiwith 
multiple gifts upon which Maria Olaussen 
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comments thus: “[s]ocial and financial ‘reward’ 
thus instrumentalizes the relationship and 
ultimately frustrates Esi’s wishes and intention—a 
sexual life free from the idea of female sexuality as 
commodity” (68).  
 
Esi misjudges polygamy and its cultural context 
and in doing so victimizes other women, at least 
Fusena, and contributes to her own melancholy. 
However, as a “reformist” (Arndt 33) African 
writer in Changes, “Aidoo seeks to renegotiate the 
identity of African women, particularly the way in 
which it is represented in literature, and to re-
examine the issues such women face, including 
female independence and the nature and form of an 
equal relationship between a man and a woman” 
(Simpson 168). By so doing, Changes complicates 
feminism and women’s rights but provides 
potentials for investigating women’s issues on a 
wider canvas, issues that are also pertinent in most 
other societies in Africa and elsewhere. 
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